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Abstract—In a previous article for S&P magazine [8], we
made a case for the new intellectual challenges in Internet of
Things security research. In this article, we revisit our earlier
observations, and discuss a few results from the computer
security community that tackle new issues. Using this sampling
of recent work, we identify a few broad general themes for future
work.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bruce Schneier, a noted computer security and cryptography
expert, recently noted that “Our cars are computers with an
engine, our ATMs are computers with money inside, and our
refrigerators are computers that keep things cold.” The prolif-
eration of the Internet of Things (IoT) is augmenting everyday
objects with computational and networking capabilities. The
IoT brings many benefits ranging from safety and security to
efficiency. However, it also brings many security and privacy
threats. In classical computer security, the maximal damage
an attacker could inflict was limited to data loss. With the
IoT, attackers can have physical effects in the world, such as
opening doors [7], causing fake fire alarms [7], and disrupting
electricity supply [17]. The computer security and privacy
community has recognized this emerging problem, and has
focused its efforts on understanding and fixing its issues.
An often-asked question is, are there any new intellectual
challenges in securing these systems? This is a natural question
to ask given that recent high-profile IoT security events like the
Mirai attack [1] largely depended on known traditional security
issues (e.g., default passwords, lack of network security). We
believe that like any emerging area, there are new problems,
old ones in new forms, and problems we know how to solve. In
our previous article, “Internet of Things Security Research: A
rehash of old ideas or new intellectual challenges?”, we made
an early case for why there might exist intellectually novel
and challenging problems in securing these systems. In this
article, we revisit those observations, and discuss novel results
that have arisen since then. As this is an active area, we take
a broad view on IoT security and privacy, but we do not try
to be complete in our treatment. Our goal is to provide a few
pointers to recent work that brings new problems and solutions
to light and, in doing so, identify a few general themes and
future paths.
II. A SAMPLING OF RECENT RESULTS IN IOT SECURITY
In this article, we discuss a sampling of recent results that
have appeared in academic security conferences, including
work at conferences in related areas (Table I). We sampled
papers to achieve broad coverage of novel themes—a com-
prehensive treatment of existing work is outside the scope
of this article. We organize our discussion based on the IoT
computing stack introduced in our earlier article [8]:
• Hardware layer: the embedded systems that make up IoT
devices. These devices use sensors and actuators to sense
and effect physical change in their environments.
• Network layer: the set of network protocols and other
communication infrastructure that enable devices to talk
with each other, and with other pieces of software that
form an IoT ecosystem.
• Middleware layer: the software and services that under-
stands heterogeneous IoT protocols, and enables higher-
level functionality to execute. This can include cloud-
hosted services.
• Users and Applications layer: the topmost layer that users
can see. This layer is often specific to a domain. For
example, in the context of smart homes, this layer could
be if-this-then-that style programs.
The results we discuss in this article address issues in
all these layers. Within a specific layer, we organize our
discussion around a set of themes. The themes broadly char-
acterize why the problems and solutions considered in the
corresponding papers are novel.
A. Hardware Security and Physical Safety
Theme: Environmental Factors. Embedded systems de-
ployed in homes, buildings, cities, and on our bodies cannot
be replaced as frequently as we replace our laptops or phones.
For example, it is uncommon to replace a refrigerator every
year, nor is it common to replace a pacemaker frequently.
Furthermore, IoT devices and sensors may be deployed inside
concrete, under water, or in other harsh and/or hard to reach
conditions. The deployment environments of IoT devices lead
to new challenges. One such challenge is to ensure security
properties like encryption remain secure for long periods of
time. Several crypto-systems have gone from being recom-
mended to being insecure in less than 10 years [11]. Ensuring
that a system remains secure for long periods of time is
difficult because attackers adapt quickly. Kiningham et al.
make this observation, and outline the CESEL architecture
that can remain secure for 20 years [11], a reasonable period
of time for IoT devices. CESEL consists of five primitives
specifically chosen to be useful in that time frame. These
properties are based on a few fundamental primitives that
are currently common to cryptographic systems and protocols
such as nonces, and modular arithmetic. Another issue is how
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TABLE I
SAMPLING OF PAPERS CONSIDERED IN THIS ARTICLE, AND SOME FUTURE CHALLENGES THAT ARISE AS A RESULT.
Category Paper General Themes in IoT Security Potential Future Challenges
Hardware, Physical Safety Ding et al. [5] Properties of deployment
environments that affect security
guarantees; Physical-world aware
security
Interplay between intermittently-powered
devices and security; Classic security
mechanisms extended to be physically
aware
Kiningham et al. [11]
Rahmati et al. [14]
Simpson et al. [16]
Soltan et al. [17]
Network Formby et al. [9] Behavior Predictability;
Conflicting Security Properties;
New Privacy Attacks and
Defenses
Comprehensive investigations of
conflicting properties and behavior
predictability; Energy-security tradeoff for
padding-based privacy defenses
Wilson et al. [18]
Apthorpe et al. [3]
Middleware, OS Fernandes et al. [6] Decentralization of trust;
Designing access control systems
around environmental context;
Global Safety and Security
Properties
Exploring integrity, confidentiality, and
availability problems for decentralized
middleware; Designing access control
systems with sensing as a core component;
Model physical interactions
Schuster et al. [15]
Celik et al. [4]
Users, Applications He et al. [10] Interplay of usability, security, and
multi-user devices; Attacks that
rely on a lack of usability and on
new interaction modalities; Risk
asymmetry
Understanding the efficacy and usability of
sensing for access control and
authentication purposes; Understanding
and mitigating inter-personal issues in
multi-user devices; Defending against
voice-based confusion attacks
Kumar et al. [12]
Rahmati et al. [13]
Zhang et al. [20]
Zeng et al. [19]
to patch these devices against new security vulnerabilities.
This is especially challenging given that the IoT space is
dominated by startups, many of whom will either perish to
the market forces, ending support for their devices, or do
not have the resources or technical knowledge to maintain an
update infrastructure. Simpson et al. [16] propose creation of a
central security manager built on top of the smart homes hub or
gateway router to alleviate this problem in home IoT settings.
However, this solution only targets home IoT hubs and will
not be applicable in settings where such a hub does not exist.
Harsh deployment conditions may also affect devices access
to a constant source of energy and the IoT devices have to rely
on energy harvesting from sources such as solar, vibration, or
RF to satisfy their requirements. Having intermittent access to
energy poses new security challenges. Rahmati et al. [14] for
example, highlight the lack of trusted source of time in this
context and propose coarse-grained time measurements using
volatile memory decay.
Theme: Physical Attacks. A standard attacker technique in
computer networks is to move laterally between nodes—an
attacker might compromise a specific user’s computer, and
then use that as a launch point to compromise other systems
in the network. Ding et al. discussed how an attacker might
use physical channels to achieve this lateral movement [5].
For instance, assume a home has a temperature sensor, a
thermostat, and a user-created rule that automatically opens
the windows if the temperature goes above a certain value.
An enterprising thief might compromise the thermostat, and
then realize that they can turn it on to increase temperature
in the room, triggering the user-created rule to open the
windows. Ding et al. also proposed techniques to detect
such interaction chains automatically by taking into account
physical interactions in addition to digital interactions.
Similar to how botnets can disrupt network infrastructure
and services, Attacks on the IoT can damage physical in-
frastructure. Stuxnet worm [2], for example, targeted Iran’s
nuclear facilities and damaged its centrifuges. Similar attacks
can potentially affect civilian infrastructure. Soltan et al. [17]
discuss attacks on the power grid using a set of compromised
high-wattage consumer appliances like ovens, and heaters. Pre-
vious attacks on the power grid often involved vulnerabilities
in the management interfaces or the SCADA systems that com-
prise the grid. However, the introduction of Internet-connected
appliances violates the fundamental assumption in power grid
design that the consumer patterns are not adversarial.
Future Challenges. Stepping back, we remark on a few future
challenges in hardware and physical layer security inspired
by the papers discussed above. We expect that many IoT
devices will be deployed in difficult-to-reach environments,
such as sensors in concrete bridges that harvest power using
vibrations, and sensors inside the human body. The properties
of these environments introduce new challenges: (1) The in-
terplay between security primitives and intermittently-powered
or ultra-low powered devices requires further investigation.
For example does a CESEL mote provide any properties that
allow a sensor to pick up a security protocol from where
it left off because it ran out of power? Developing cryp-
tographic algorithms, secure hardware, or software targeting
these applications is an open area of research. (2) How do
we extend current security mechanisms such as information
flow control and model checking to account for physical-world
interactions? (3) How can embedded systems be patched and
secured against future attacks if they are no longer supported
by their manufacturer?
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B. Network
Theme: Behavior Predictability. Most general-purpose com-
puter systems support varied functionality. This translates to
highly varying network signatures, making security mech-
anisms like anomaly detection difficult due to errors. By
contrast, IoT devices have well-defined functions—a door lock
opens and closes, an industrial relay is either on or off. Thus,
we observe that IoT device network behavior can be relatively
stable compared to other kinds of computer systems. Formby
et al. use this notion in their work on creating behavioral
fingerprints for industrial control systems (ICS) [9]. A key
observation in their work is that ICS devices have simple and
well-defined functions, leading to relatively stable network
signatures. Stepping back, we see that a classic network
security technique can leverage the unique aspects of IoT
devices to reduce errors.
Theme: Conflicting Properties. The main job of the TLS
protocol is to enable end-to-end encryption between two
computer systems so that third parties cannot inspect com-
munication. It is generally a good sign that IoT devices
support TLS. However, many times users want to audit and
inspect what these devices are saying about them and their
activities. Unfortunately, the TLS protocol does not allow
this kind of inspection, leading to a conflict between security
and auditability. We do not run into this conflict in the
traditional web setting because the user controls one end of
the TLS connection. Wilson et al. made this observation and
invented TLS-Rotate-and-Release (TLS-Rar). This protocol
allows for trusted auditing devices to decrypt TLS streams
without compromising future communication.
Theme: New Privacy Attacks and Defenses. Apthorpe et
al. recently showed that network observers can infer IoT
device activity even when the streams are encrypted [3].
Such an inference in the general case is error-prone because
computers are general purpose devices. However, the behavior
predictability discussed above can enable high-fidelity recon-
struction of device and user activity from encrypted streams.
Investigating such attacks in the context of non-IP protocols
is an interesting open area. Apthorpe et al. also present a set
of defenses based on independent link padding showing, that
it can be effective, and bandwidth-efficient.
Future Challenges. Stepping back, we remark on a few
themes and open challenges in this space. Behavior pre-
dictability is a general emergent theme for IoT devices.
This can enable new defenses, and new attacks as well. An
open opportunity is to thoroughly investigate this issue along
multiple dimensions such as non-IP protocols, and resource
constraints. For example, Apthorpe et al. discussed a padding
defense. An open question might be: What is the cost of such
padding on energy-constrained devices that uses protocols like
BLE? This introduces a new energy-security tradeoff into
padding defenses. Another challenge concerns the theme of
conflicting properties. Currently, it is unknown whether there
are other security properties that we take for granted in the
non-IoT world, but have undesirable properties in the IoT
world. Investigating these conflicting properties in a more
comprehensive manner is an open and novel research question.
C. Middleware and OS
Theme: Decentralization of Trust. A primary function of the
middleware layer is to enable interoperability between multiple
IoT ecosystems. Current consumer-grade IoT devices, such
as those found in homes, and offices exhibit heterogeneity in
their communication protocols and in their APIs. This hetero-
geneity exists due to resource constraints (e.g., Bluetooth Low
Energy used in battery-powered presence detectors), a lack of
standardization, and market competition. Middleware, such as
Samsung SmartThings, and If-This-Then-That (IFTTT) under-
stands many protocols, and enables programmers and users to
create automations that span diverse sets of devices. Fernandes
et al. examined the security design issues in the IFTTT
platform [6]. The IFTTT platform uses OAuth tokens (a type
of bearer credential) to gain access to a user’s resources. Using
these tokens, IFTTT can execute rules of the form: if trigger
then action. Fernandes et al. observed that middleware like
IFTTT becomes a gold mine of tokens when we consider the
scale at which these services operate. If such middleware is
compromised, millions of security credentials will be leaked.
Consequently, Fernandes et al. proposed Decentralized Action
Integrity, a security principle that provides the guarantee that
even if the tokens are stolen, the attacker cannot use them
arbitrarily. Although the notion of an integrity guarantee is not
new, the IoT setting opens up new research opportunities for
formulating and enforcing decentralized security properties.
The general takeaway is that IoT systems are fundamentally
decentralized, and security mechanisms should consequently
be decentralized as well. Another novelty is that decentraliza-
tion can address the ‘end-of-life’ problem. Physical devices
like door locks and refrigerators have long service lives, and
can outlast the companies that make them. If an IoT device
or middleware is dependent on infrastructure maintained by
a company that could eventually stop a product line, will the
automations continue to function? Worse yet, if a company
goes out of business, who would maintain the infrastructure?
Decentralization provides an answer by moving functionality
closer to the end-nodes. DTAP exemplifies this idea by using
the IFTTT-cloud only as compute infrastructure. Conceptually,
any cloud service can replace the IFTTT-cloud component in
DTAP architecture.
Theme: Contextual Access Control. Another function of
middleware is to enforce proper access control and authoriza-
tion. A defining characteristic of access control in the IoT
setting is that many decisions are contextual. For example,
access to a sprinkler might only be allowed when someone
is at home. Schuster et al. explored the use of context in
access control decisions, and observed that access control in
the home is often decentralized in addition to being contextual,
often occurring in multiple independent frameworks [15]. For
example, the Nest thermostat and the LG oven might each
implement their own context detection and access control
framework. Instead of duplicating functionality, Schuster et
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al. propose the Environmental Situation Oracle (ESO) that
encapsulates the sensing of physical contexts. In contrast to
existing notions of context (e.g., what IP address range did the
login occur from?), the novel challenge in the IoT setting is
to sense physical phenomena (e.g., someone is near the oven)
in a usable, scalable, and secure way.
Theme: Global Interactions. The middleware enables many
different kinds of automations to run concurrently. A set of
programs interacts with many physical devices in a single
deployment. Even if individual programs are safe, unsafe
situations can arise when we consider the behavior of this
collection of programs as a whole. This is a very complex
problem in the general case, making reasoning about global
safety properties difficult. However, in the smart home setting,
the individual programs are generally simple. Thus, examining
global safety and security properties in the context of home
automation programs is a promising and novel area of inves-
tigation. Recently, Celik et al. built the Soteria system that
uses model checking to jointly investigate the security of IoT
environments—a collection of physical devices and multiple
automation programs [4].
Future Challenges. Stepping back, we remark on a few open
challenges in this space. Like many computing systems before,
we see IoT middleware architecture placing undue trust in cen-
tralized untrustworthy components. As many IoT systems are
fundamentally decentralized, it is sensible to express security
guarantees in a decentralized way as well. Specifically, the
challenge is to de-privilege centers of trust, such as monolithic
web apps (e.g., IFTTT), into smaller units where each user
only trusts a minimal amount of infrastructure. Additionally,
IoT deployments consist of a set of automations, and analyzing
the security and safety of the environment as a whole is an
open problem when we consider physical interactions between
entities. Finally, another challenge concerns that fact that
access control for IoT is physically contextual. Designing
systems to sense and enforce contextual-policies presents new
opportunities. Sensing of context in particular has strong
connections to usability, and we explore this in the next
section.
D. Users and Applications
Theme: Usability of Contextual Authentication and Access
Control. Authentication in traditional computing systems gen-
erally involves mechanisms like user names and passwords.
In a smart home setting, many devices do not have traditional
input-output modalities such as a screen or keyboard. Thus,
exploring new forms of establishing identity is an interesting
new challenge. Biometrics is a popular alternative, but unlike
passwords, it is inexact and can make errors. Understanding
the impact of these errors, and corresponding user behavior
is an open question. He et al. recently conducted a study to
explore access control and authentication of users to devices,
and concluded that contextual factors and interpersonal rela-
tionships should play a more significant role in access control
policies than they currently do [10]. Zeng et al. also report on
a study investigating usability issues of current access control
mechanisms in homes with multiple users, concluding that
multi-user issues will be a new challenge [19].
Theme: Risk Asymmetry. Another aspect of usability con-
cerns how to present app permission requests to users. Current
designs group device operations into similar functional units.
For example, oven.on and oven.off are in the same
functional group. However, physical device operations have
clear and intuitive notions of risk: oven.on is a potential
fire hazard, oven.off is potentially uncooked food. Rahmati
et al. observe this risk asymmetry and contributed a design
process to leverage risk asymmetry as an alternative to func-
tional groupings of permissions. The resulting system, Tyche,
showed that apps can remain functional with 60% less access
to high-risk operations.
Theme: Novel Attacks due to New Interaction Modalities.
Usability issues also permit novel attacks. Kumar et al. and
Zhang et al. recently discovered voice-based confusion attacks
on smart speakers like Amazon Alexa and Google Home [12],
[20]. An attack is a set of spoken words that sound similar,
such as “Hey Alexa, ask Capital One to...” and “Hey Alexa,
ask Capitol Won to...” These attacks leverage a combination of
lack of user awareness about the specific application they are
talking to, and the deficiencies in current speech processing
technology. This is complicated by the fact that many voice
assistant currently lack the general context humans have when
conversing. Exploring methods to increase this context in
the hope of disambiguating confusing situations is an open
research area.
Future Challenges. Stepping back, we discuss a few open
challenges in this layer: (1) we realize that access control
and authentication in homes is contextual, and will occur
through non-traditional interaction modalities. Characterizing
this space and building usable systems that enforce the breadth
of access control and authentication policies will probably
require leveraging results from the ubicomp community in
sensing; (2) characterizing and navigating the interpersonal
issues in multi-user device situations presents new opportu-
nities in usability security; (3) understanding the effectiveness
of voice-based confusion attacks, and exploring defenses us-
ing biometrics and user education presents opportunities in
enhancing the design of voice assistants.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Using a sampling of recent results, we revisited our earlier
S&P article, and discussed intellectually novel and challenging
problems in IoT security and privacy. We also identified
general themes that are inspired by these results, and discussed
a few open areas for future work at all layers of the computing
stack. Although our treatment of results is incomplete, it is
broad in its coverage of novel themes. We hope that this article
spurs on research in IoT security and privacy in these new
and challenging areas, so that we may gain the benefits of a
connected world without the risks.
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